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GRAY MARKET TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS AT THE U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION: THE BENEFITS OF THE FORUM AND
ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT CASES
JOSEPH H. HECKENDORN* & LYLE B. VANDER SCHAAF**

INTRODUCTION

The International Trade Commission ("ITC" or "Commission") has long been the
preferred forum for trademark owners to enforce their trademarks against imports of
gray market goods using Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended ("Section
337").1 Indeed, most reported gray market cases since 2000 have been filed at the
ITC.2 Moreover, the three leading appellate level cases regarding gray market
trademark infringement have been appeals from ITC investigations conducted by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"). 3 Despite
the well-documented advantages that the ITC affords trademark owners and despite
this well-developed Federal Circuit case law from ITC investigations, many
trademark owners remain unfamiliar with the ITC and do not recognize the clear
4
benefits that Section 337 proceedings afford to them.
*Joseph Heckendorn is Counsel in Bryan Cave, LLP's Chicago, Illinois office. He concentrates
his practice on ITC proceedings and federal court litigation, primarily in trademark infringement
matters. He formerly worked for the ITC's Office of General Counsel and has defended clients in
two gray market trademark infringement actions at the ITC while in private practice.
**Lyle Vander Schaaf is a partner in Bryan Cave, LLP's Washington, D.C. office.
He
concentrates his practice on ITC Section 337 proceedings and ITC antidumping and countervailing
duty investigations. He worked for the ITC's Office of General Counsel from 1991 to 1996 and has
defended clients in two gray market trademark infringement actions at the ITC while in private
practice.
I Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, sec. 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703-04 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (2006)); see also 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 29:55 (4th ed. 2008) (indicating that the ITC began hearing trademark actions in the
1980s and such actions have advantages over lawsuits).
2 See Robert A. Caplen, Recent Trends UnderscoringInternationalTrade Commission Review
of Initial Determinations and Federal Cireuit Appeals from Final Commission Determinations
under Section 337of the TariffAct of 1930, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 337, 35155, 364-68 (2007) (demonstrating the popularity of ITC actions and rising number of trademark
cases).
3 See Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 444 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006); SKF USA
Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 423 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Gamut Trading Co. v. U. S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 200 F.3d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
4 Peter J. Toren, The Advantages of LitigatingPatentInfringement Lawsuits in the IT,
PAT.
STRATEGY & MGMT., June 2005, at 1, 1 ("Many IP practitioners may not be familiar, however, with
Section 337 investigations that are conducted by the International Trade Commission ("ITC"). This
avenue provides a relatively quick remedy against foreign infringers and may offer significant
advantages over traditional litigation in federal court."); see also DONALD K. DUVALL ET AL., UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND THE ITC: ACTIONS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER
SECTION 337 OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930 § 12:1 (2008 ed.) (discussing the advantages of filing
actions in the ITC). See geneorally K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 286-287 (1988)
(describing the contexts in which "gray market" decisions arise). In the same vein, parties named as
respondents and accused infringers in ITC gray market investigations do not appear to understand
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Significant debate over interpretation of the Federal Circuit's gray market
trademark decisions has perhaps resulted in some uncertainty for trademark owner's
seeking relief from the ITC. 5 However, in two recent decisions, In re Certain
6
Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof ("Agricultural Vehicles Remand")
and In re Certain Hydraulic Excavators and Components Thereof ("Hydraulic
Excavators Determination"),7 the Commission has clearly set forth what is expected
of trademark owners bringing gray market cases. This article discusses how these
recent decision by the Commission have clarified the state of the law of gray market
trademark infringement at the ITC and why the ITC remains the best forum for
trademark owners to enforce their marks and shut down imports of gray market
products bearing these marks.

I. BACKGROUND ON GRAY MARKET TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
The term "gray market goods" refers to accused imported goods that bear a
legally affixed foreign trademark that is the same mark as is registered in the United
States. 8 These "gray goods are legally acquired abroad and then imported without
the consent of the United States trademark holder." 9 In the gray market context,
where a trademark is legitimately affixed to the goods at issue, the essential
elements of infringement - likelihood of consumer confusion and attendant damage to
goodwill - are evaluated by the ITC in terms of "material differences" between
trademarked gray market imports and trademarked products sold or authorized for
sale by the U.S. mark holder. 10
The initial focus of the ITC in a gray market trademark infringement
investigation is on whether there exist differences between the products that were
sold or authorized for sale by the complainant and the accused products that were
imported and sold by a respondent.1 1 In addition, the trademark holder must
establish that any such differences are material to consumers. 12 The standard for
comparison is what consumers have come to expect when they purchase the
trademarked product. 13 If the ITC finds that the accused gray market goods are

their legal rights involved. As this article demonstrates, respondents' imports are not illegal and
will not be prohibited by the ITC if the trademark owner itself, under certain circumstances, imports
the same products as the accused infringers - that were first sold abroad.
See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 29:55 (describing the standard by which the
Federal Circuit reviews ITC decisions).
6 Comm'n Remand Op. on Violation of Section 337, Inv. No. 337-TA-487 (Sept. 17, 2008), 2008
ITC LEXIS 1806 (public version of original issued on August 25, 2008).
7 Comm'n Op., Inv. No. 337-TA-582 (Feb. 3, 2009) (public version of original issued on January
21, 2009).
8 Gamut, 200 F.3d at 778 (citing K Mart, 486 U.S. at 286-87); Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v.
Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 662 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989).
9 Gamut, 200 F.3d at 778; MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 29:46 see also KMrt,
486 U.S. at 28687 (discussing the contexts in which gray market cases arise).
10 Gamut, 200 F.3d at 779.
11 Id.
12 _d

13Id. (eitingSociete Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 641 (1st Cir.
1992) (discussing "bundle of characteristics" consumers associate with trademarks)).
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identical to "authorized" goods - or if gray market goods differ from "authorized
goods" only in ways that are not material to consumers (i.e., not significant to their
purchasing decision), the ITC will not find that the accused gray market importation
14
violates Section 337 and, therefore, does not give rise to trademark infringement.
If gray market goods are not materially different from goods sold or offered for sale
by the U.S. trademark holder, the trademark holder cannot make out a case for
infringement. 15

II. ADVANTAGES AND BENEFITS OF PURSUING TRADEMARK ENFORCEMENT AT THE ITC
Trademark owners experience a number of advantages filing their trademark
infringement and gray market goods cases with the ITC rather than in federal court.
Moreover, there are advantages to filing parallel actions in federal court and the ITC
simultaneously. Under such an approach, under U.S. statute, the respondent in the
ITC proceeding who also is a defendant in federal court has the statutory right to
stay the court proceeding pending completion of the ITC investigation. 16 This stay
continues through all appeals of the ITC proceeding, including through all applicable
17
Federal Circuit appeal proceedings and remands.
By filing a Section 337 action in the ITC as opposed to only in the federal courts,
or in parallel with a federal court action, complainants can experience the following
advantages in preserving their trademark rights:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

18
No personal jurisdiction limitations
Extremely fast relief 19
20
Powerful remedy
21
Attack multiple parties/respondents in a single action
22
Parallel actions
Cost savings 23
24
Expertise on IP issues and complex technology
25
Virtually unlimited discovery

These advantages hold particular benefits for trademark owners seeking to halt
26
trademark infringement and trafficking in gray market goods in the United States.
Id.at 778-79 (citingWeil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 672 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Id.; Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 303-304 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Martin's
Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir. 1997)
(allowing gray market importation of goods of the same quality sold before the exclusive
distributorship or those approved for sale by trademark holder).
16 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a) (2006).
14
15

17Id.(stating the stay continues until the ITC decision is final).
18 See i1nfra Part II.A.
19See
See
21 See
22 See
23 See
24 See
25 See
20

infra Part
infra Part
i1nfra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

I.B.
II.C.

II.D.
ILE.
II.F.
II.G.
II.H.
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A. No Persona]JurisdictionLimitations
There are no personal jurisdiction limitations in ITC proceedings. 27 All Section
337 actions are in rem against imports - compared to federal court litigation, which is
28
constrained by personal and subject matter jurisdiction limitations of the courts.
This presents perhaps the most salient difference between ITC litigation and federal
court litigation.2 9 If a trademark owner faces numerous infringers in various regions
of the United States, a single ITC action often is the most cost efficient and most
effective cause of action available. 30 Where a federal court may lack personal
jurisdiction over a foreign supplier of gray market goods (because the supplier is
located in a foreign country), the ITC most likely will have jurisdiction to adjudicate
the sales of this supplier if it sold for importation into the United State or imported
the goods into the United States itself.31

B. Extremely FastRelief
ITC trademark and gray market goods investigations take anywhere from
twelve months to sixteen months from institution to completion. 32 Under the ITC's
34
new Rules, 33 most investigations will likely follow a sixteenth-month target date.
However, these new Rules require that Administrative Law Judges ("A.L.J.s)
provide in the schedule at least a four-month period between the A.L.J.'s initial
26 See V. James Adduci II & Michael L. Doane, Curbing Counterfeit Goods, LEGAL TIMES, Sept.
8, 1997, at 546 (asserting that the ITC provides advantages over the courts for trademark holders in
general).
27 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2006) (granting jurisdiction to the ITC on all "unfair methods of
competition and unfair activities in the importation of articles").
28 Compare id. (granting jurisdiction against goods), with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 1 (limiting
federal subject matter jurisdiction to enumerated instances), U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring
due process of law; as interpreted by Supreme Court decisions defining bounds of personal
jurisdiction), and Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 111-16 (1987)
(requiring minimum contacts with forum State to establish personal jurisdiction over foreign
defendant).
29 See Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An EmpiricalAnalysis of Patent Cases at the
International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 73-74 (2008) (discussing several
jurisdictional advantages).
30 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (ordering exclusion of products regardless of manufacturer); In re
Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps and Components Thereof, USITC Pub. 1199, Comm'n Op. 18,
Inv. 337-TA-90 (Nov. 1981), 216 U.S.P.Q. 465, 473 (noting benefit of filing one complaint against
several separate foreign manufacturers).
31 Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (ordering exclusion of products regardless of manufacturer),
with Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 111-16 (1987) (requiring
minimum contacts with forum State to establish personal jurisdiction over foreign defendant).
32 DUVALL ET AL., supra note 4, § 12:1, at 460 (the A.L.J. is predisposed to "set the target date
[of decisions] in most cases at 12-15 months from institution"); see also Procedures for
Investigations and Related Proceedings Concerning Unfair Practices in Import Trade, 61 Fed. Reg.
43,429, 43,432 (Aug. 23, 1996) ("It is expected that target dates will rarely exceed 15 months").
33 See Rules of General Application and Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,280301 (Dec. 20, 2007) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pts. 201, 210).
34 19 C.F.R. § 210.51 (2008) (making an A.L.J.'s order a final determination not subject to
interlocutory review if the target date does not exceed sixteen months).
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determination and the target completion date of the investigation by the
Commissioners. 35 This is to give the Commissioners sufficient time to determine
whether to review the initial determination and also to give the Commissioners
sufficient time to make a final determination after electing to review the initial
determination.3 6 A.L.J.s also often require two to three months after the hearing
(trial) to render their initial determinations.3 7 Therefore, the hearing (trial) in ITC
trademark and gray market goods investigations will occur six to seven months prior
to the target completion date of the investigation - in other words, within nine to ten
38
months after the investigation is instituted.
No federal court offers as speedy a process from institution of a proceeding to
trial as the ITC. 3 9 For parties seeking to negotiate settlements, this speedy process
is very beneficial in as much as settlements often do not occur until trial dates
approach. 40 Moreover, trademark owners seeking fast relief will be hard pressed to
find a federal court that can offer relief faster than the ITC's twelve to sixteen-month
rocket docket. 41
In addition, temporary relief is afforded under the Commission's temporary
exclusion order ("TEO") proceedings. 42 Although these proceedings are rarely used,
they offer relief for parties demanding immediate relief within four months of the
43
proceeding being instituted.
ITC Section 337 proceedings are not halted or stayed pending resolution of
motions for summary determination or discovery motions, such as motions to quash
45
discovery. 44 Rather, all proceedings continue while such motions are adjudicated.
Also, ITC determinations, exclusion orders and cease and desist orders normally are
not stayed pending appeal to the Federal Circuit.46
§ 210.42(a)(1)(i).
36 Rules of General Application and Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 Fed. Reg. at 72,289
(amending rule due to "insufficient ... number of days allotted to the Commission to complete its
investigations").
37 G. Brian Busey, An Introduction to Section 337 and the US. International Trade
Commission, in PATENT LITIGATION 2008, at 11, 25 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary
Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 949, 2008), available atWL, 949 PLI/Pat 11.
38 fd
'3 DUVALL ET AL., supra note 4, § 12:1, at 460 (stating an ITC decision is "certainly quicker
than a final decision can normally be obtained in a federal district court"); Vivek Koppikar,
Evaluating the International Trade Commission's Section 337 Investigation, 86 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 432, 434 (2004) (indicating the fifteen-month average ITC investigation is
less than the twenty-two month average patent litigation in the federal district courts).
40 See The Corporate Counsel Section of the New York State Bar Association, Report on Cost
Effective Management of Corporate Litigation, 59 ALB. L. REV. 263, 295-96 (1995) (stating that
corporations frequently overlook settlement possibilities until nearly the end of litigation).
41 See Busey, supra note 37, at 35 (comparing ITC cases targeted in the 12-15 month range
with federal courts at 24 months or longer); see also Koppikar, supra note 39, at 434 (indicating the
fifteen-month average ITC investigation is less than the twenty-two month average patent litigation
in the federal district courts).
42See 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.52-.70 (2008).
43 19 C.F.R. § 210.66(a).
44 Busey, supranote 37, at 23 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) requiring Commission to terminate
at the earliest practicable time).
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 176 F. App'x 976, 977 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (denying stay pending appeal). But see Broadcom Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, No. 07-1164
3 19 C.F.R.
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C. Powerful Remedy
In addition to being very speedy, ITC proceedings also afford trademark owners
a very powerful remedy that cannot be attained in federal courts. 47 ITC general
exclusion orders provide for complete exclusion of gray market imports enforced by
U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("Customs") at U.S. ports. 48 ITC cease and
desist orders provide for a complete injunction against sales-related activity in the
United States for the life of the trademark involved. 49 In comparison, federal courts
lack authority to order Customs to enforce injunctions and must abide by the fourfactor balancing test before any injunctive relief will be granted. 50 Injunctive relief
at the ITC, in the form of exclusion orders and cease and desist orders, is virtually
automatic, and the four-factor test for obtaining injunctive relief in federal court does
51
not apply to ITC final determinations.

D. Attack Multiple Parties/Respondentsin a Single Action
Trademark owners also are able to attack multiple accused infringers in a single
ITC proceeding. 52 This allows more efficient and effective enforcement of trademark
rights.
Trademark owners can pursue an unlimited number of infringing
parties/respondents, whether foreign or domestic, in a single ITC action unlike in the
federal courts, where plaintiffs must abide by limitations of a court's personal
3

jurisdiction. 5

(Fed. Cir. Sept. 12, 2007) (docket no. 101) ("Ordered: ...The LEO [limited exclusion order] is stayed
with respect to [some parties].").
47See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (providing as remedy an exclusion order unless certain exceptions
are satisfied); id. § 1337(f)(1) (providing for cease and desist orders in addition to, or in lieu of,
exclusion orders).
48 Id. § 1337(d)(1) (excluding all concerned articles from entry into the United States enforced
through the Secretary of the Treasury through proper officers); see also Busey, supra note 37, at 3335 (providing U.S. Customs and Border Protection as enforcement of ITC orders).
49 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1) (directing infringers to "cease and desist from engaging in the unfair
methods or acts involved").
50See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (requiring a plaintiff to
demonstrate "(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such
as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4)
that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction").
51Robert W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, AssessingBias in PatentInfringement Cases: A Review of
InternationalTrade Commission Decisions, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 457, 486 (2008) (discussing how
the ITC awards patent holders nearly automatic injunctive relief if it finds infringement). This is
even the case for patent-based cases. Although federal courts must apply the four-factor balancing
test enunciated by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in eBay, Inc. v.MereExehange, no such
requirement applies to ITC proceedings. Rather, injunctive relief is automatic if Section 337 is
violated through a case of patent infringement. Id.
52 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (ordering exclusion of products regardless of manufacturer).
53 Compare id. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (granting jurisdiction against goods), with U.S. CONST. art. 11,
§ 2 cl. 1 (limiting federal subject matter jurisdiction to enumerated instances), U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (requiring due process of law; as interpreted by Supreme Court decisions defining bounds of
personal jurisdiction), and Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 111-16
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ITC procedures are specifically designed for trademark owners to attack several
infringing respondents in a single suit, which (1) reduces trademark
enforcement/policing costs;

54

(2) reduces litigation costs by eliminating duplicative

and overlapping suits in multiple jurisdictions; 55 (3) enhances likelihood of success by
pitting one respondent against another in the same forum before the same judge with
respect to substantive legal or factual issues, such as interpretations of trademark
meaning; 56 and (4) increases the likelihood of a general exclusion order that Customs
uses to halt all infringing imports no matter what the source, whether imported by
57
named respondents or others.

E. ParallelActions
If a trademark owner files a parallel suit in federal court, the federal court suit
is stayed pending completion of ITC case and, thereafter, the trademark owner may
pursue the only remaining issue in federal court - damages. 58 Of the Section 337
actions filed in 2008, almost half involved parallel action in federal courts which will
allow the complainant/plaintiff to use the ITC's rocket docket procedures to obtain
quick discovery and a quick infringement decision that then could be brought before
59
the courts to secure monetary damages.

(1987) (requiring minimum contacts with forum State to establish personal jurisdiction over foreign
defendant).
54 In
re Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps and Components Thereof, USITC Pub. 1199,
Comm'n Op. 18, Inv. 337-TA-90 (Nov. 1981), 216 U.S.P.Q. 465, 473.
Trademark
enforcement/investigation costs for the Commission are reduced as a result of combining several
complaints. Id., 216 U.S.P.Q. at 473.
55Id., 216 U.S.P.Q. at 473 (recognizing the economic burden to the complainant if requiring
separate complaints against each manufacturer); see also Robert G. Krupka, Philip C. Swain, &
Russell E. Levine, Section 337 and the GART: The Problem or the Solution, 42 AM.U. L. REV. 779,
802-03 (1993) (recognizing the avoidance of continual litigation through the use of a general
exclusion order).
56 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (providing one forum for complaints against several infringers);
Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process. Special Masters in the
Supreme Court's OriginalJurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 679 (2002) (ALJs usually have
developed expertise with regard to the issues they adjudicate, particularly where their jurisdiction is
closely circumscribed.").
57Id. § 1337(d)(1) (providing as remedy an exclusion order against goods regardless of
manufacturer); see also DUVALL ET AL., supra note 4, § 12:1, at 460 (exclusion of articles whether or
not manufacturer participated in section 337 proceedings).
5S 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a) (2006) (requiring district court's to stay proceedings upon request
pending decision from ITC); 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (d)(1), (e)(1), (f)(1) (providing as remedy only exclusion
orders and cease and desist orders); DUVALL ET AL., supra note 4, § 12:1, at 460 (describing the use
of a district court proceeding to secure monetary damages).
59See Michael A. Ritscher et al., The Status ofDual Path Litigation in the ITC and the Courts:
Issues of Jurisdiction, Res Judicata and Appellate Review, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 155, 158 (1990)
(estimating that almost every third investigation conducted by the Commission is also filed in
federal courts); see also Toren, supra note 4, at 7 (stating that Section 377 does not provide for
monetary damages).
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F Cost Savings
Among all the benefits of the ITC, perhaps the one that resonates most with
trademark owners, particularly during downturns in the economy and during
reduced market activity, is the lower cost of an ITC proceeding in comparison to law
suits in federal court. 60 ITC trademark infringement investigations are less costly
than law suits in federal district court because (1) infringement is halted sooner,
allowing quick return of business revenues; 6 1 (2) attorneys fees are lower due to
strict ITC time constraints that force efficiency and movement directly to discoveryrelated and litigation-related tasks; 62 (3) there are no costs associated with jury
selection and jury trial or damages discovery and trial;6 3 and, as discussed above, (4)
multiple infringing parties may be sued in a single, low-cost action.64

G. Expertise on IP Issues and Complex Technology
Another benefit to ITC proceedings is the fact that the ITC's A.L.J.s and
Commissioners are very experienced and adept at IP litigation matters, including
often complicated trademark and gray market issues. 65 Although trademark cases
often do not involve the complicated technological issues that can arise in patentbased litigation, gray market trademark proceedings often do include complex issues
relating to the asserted material differences between authorized goods and gray
(30
Krupka et al., supra note 55, at 803 (stating availability of exclusion order against multiple
manufacturers as cost effective); see also In re Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps and Components
Thereof, USITC Pub. 1199, Comm'n Op. 18, Inv. 337-TA-90 (Nov. 1981), 216 U.S.P.Q. 465, 473
(recognizing the burden on domestic patentees required to file multiple complaints against multiple
respondents).
(31See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (requiring ITC to conclude its investigation at "earliest possible
time"); see also DUVALL ET AL., supra note 4, § 12:1, at 460 (stating an ITC decision is "certainly
quicker than a final decision can normally be obtained in a federal district court"); Busey, supra note
37, at 35 ("Among the most important advantages of a Section 337 case is the speed of the typical
ITC case").
62 See Busey, supra note 37, at 36 (indicating that expediency of ITC decisions accelerates and
compresses the costs of litigation).
(3Terry Lynn Clark, The Future of Patent-BasedInvestigations Under Section 337 After the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 38 Am. U. L. Rev. 1149, 1169 (1989) (stating that
litigation costs are reduced in the ITC because the ITC is not authorized to award damages, thus
resulting in one fewer issue to litigate); Bryan A. Schwartz, Beyond the Amendments: Federal and
ITC Case Law Developments That May Determine the Long-Term Future ofSection 337 Litigation,
22 AIPLA Q.J. 491, 496-97 (1994) (stating juries are not used in ITC proceedings).
(34
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (providing as remedy an exclusion order against goods regardless of
manufacturer); see also In re Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps and Components Thereof, USITC
Pub. 1199, Comm'n Op. 18, Inv. 337-TA-90 (Nov. 1981), 216 U.S.P.Q. at 473 (recognizing the burden
on domestic patentees required to file multiple complaints against multiple respondents).
65 See Carstens, supra note 56, at 679 (ALJs usually have developed expertise with regard to
the issues they adjudicate, particularly where their jurisdiction is closely circumscribed."); see also
Virginia L. Carron, Intellectua] PropertyLitigation at the US. InternationalTrade Commission, in
PATENT LITIGATION 2007, at 1025, 1033 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.,
Course Handbook Ser. No. 910, 2007), available at WL, 910 PLI/Pat 1025 (indicating that one of the
benefits of ITC litigation is A.L.J.s are generally more familiar with technology than district court
judges).
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market goods.6 6 Moreover, trademark cases often involve complex survey issues and
results.67 Commissioners, A.L.J.s, and Commission Staff have significant experience
in complex technological fields and trademark law and handle numerous IP actions
each year thereby enhancing the likelihood that the correct legal and factual decision
will result.68 In comparison, a Judge in federal court and his law clerk (not to
mention the jury) may have no familiarity with IP law, trademark law or technology
at issue with respect to the asserted material difference in a gray market trademark
case.69

H. Virtually UnlimitedDiscovery
Unlike federal court, ITC trademark and gray market goods investigations offer
virtually unlimited discovery. 70 ITC proceedings offer nationwide discovery available
against any party, nationwide subpoena authority against non-parties by quick pro
forma subpoena power, foreign discovery against any party without constraints of the
Hague Convention, and no specified limitation on the number of interrogatories or
discovery requests, 71 unlike federal court which requires adherence to the Hague
72
Convention for foreign discovery and imposes limitations on interrogatory requests.

III.

REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING GRAY MARKET TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AT
THE ITC

As discussed above, the first question in gray market cases involving goods of
foreign origin is "whether there are differences between the foreign and domestic
product and if so whether those differences are material." 73 On the question of
material difference, the Federal Circuit has noted that the threshold for such a
66 See, e.g., SKF USA Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 423 F.3d 1307, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(discussing various findings by the A.L.J. of "material differences" in an ITC trademark case).
(7 Soo, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing routine
use of surveys to prove actual confusion in trademark infringement cases); In re Stereotaxis, Inc.,
429 F.3d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating evidence of trademark infringement may properly
come in the form of surveys in addition to dictionaries or newspapers (quoting In re Bed & Breakfast
Registry. 791 F.2d 157, 160 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
(3 Busey, supra note 37, at 35; Carstens, supra note 56, at 679.
( Busey, supra note 37, at 36.
70 19 C.F.R. § 210.27(b)(1) (2006) (providing for discovery regarding any non-privileged matter
not exempted by statute or the A.L.J.); see also Busey, supra note 38, at 25-26.
71 19 C.F.R. § 210.32 (providing for subpoena authority); Krupka et al., supra note 55, at 862
(noting the advantage of the ITC's ability to work outside of the Hague Convention). Although there
is no ITC Rule limiting any discovery tool, some A.L.J.s have ground rules limiting the number of
requests for interrogatories a party may serve. See, e.g., In re Certain Absorbent Garments, Order
No. 2: Notice of Ground Rules and Target Date and Order Setting Date for Submission of Discovery
Statements 18, Inv. No. 337-TA-508 (May 7, 2004), 2004 ITC LEXIS 345, at *16 (A.L.J. Charles E.
Bullock). However, these A.L.J.s limit such requests for interrogatories to 175 (an almost unheard
of number in federal court) and, in any event, also allow for additional interrogatory requests with
permission of the A.L.J. I-d., 2004 ITC LEXIS 345, at *16.
72 Krupka et al., supra note 55, at 862.
73 Gamut Trading Co. v. U. S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 200 F.3d 775, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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determination is quite low. 7 4 There must only be a showing that consumers would
find the differences between the products authorized for sale in the United States
75
and the unauthorized products significant in making purchasing decisions.
If there are material differences between the conforming domestic trademarked
good and the accused imported product, then to prevail on a gray market trademark
infringement claim, the trademark holder also must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that "all or substantially all" of its authorized products are accompanied by
each of the asserted material differences. 7 6 Specifically, the trademark holder must
prove to the ITC that "all or substantially all" of its authorized products are
accompanied by the material differences and it is not enough to merely demonstrate
77
that some or even most of its authorized products possessed the material difference.
Under SKF and Bourdeau, if all or substantially all of the authorized sales do not
have each of the identified material differences, then the trademark owner has
contributed to confusion in the market and it cannot establish a violation of Section
78
337 by the imported gray market goods.
Thus, recent ITC gray market cases have centered on two main issues: (1) what
constitutes an authorized sale of the trademark holder; and (2) what constitutes "all
or substantially all" of the trademark holder's sales. 7 9 The Agricultural Vehicles
Remand8 0 sheds light on each of these questions.

IV. THE AGRICULTURAL VEHICLEsREMAND

The Commission instituted its investigation In re Certain Agricultural Vehicles
on February 13, 2003, based on a complaint filed by Deere & Company ("Deere") for
gray market trademark infringement related to imports of European-version selfpropelled forage harvesters ("EVSPFHs").81 On May 26, 2004, the Commission
issued a general exclusion order prohibiting the unlicensed entry for consumption of
EVSPFHs manufactured by or under the authority of Deere, which infringe any of
the asserted trademarks.8 2 On March 30, 2006, the Federal Circuit issued its
decision in the appeal, vacating and remanding the Commission's final determination

Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 444 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1323-24.
76 Id.
at 1326 n.4 (citing SKF USA Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 423 F.3d 1307, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (quoting Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296,
1304 (5th Cir. 1997))); SH-F 423 F.3d at 1315-16.
77 Bourdeau, 444 F.3d at 1326 n.4 (citing SKF, 423 F.3d at 1316 (quoting Martin's Herend
Imports, 112 F.3d at 1304)); SKF, 423 F.3d at 1315-16; Martin'sHerendImports, 112 F.3d at 1304.
78 Bourdeau, 444 F.3d at 1323-24; SK
423 F.3d at 1313-14.
9 See Bourdeau, 444 F.3d at 1320-21 (discussing what products are not authorized for sale);
SKF,423 F.3d at 1317-18 (discussing what does not constitute all or substantially all).
8 In -r Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, Comm'n Remand Op. on
Violation of Section 337, Inv. No. 337-TA-487 (Sept. 17, 2008), 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806 (public version
of original issued on August 25, 2008).
81 In -r Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, Notice of Investigation, Inv.
No. 337-TA-487 (Feb. 13, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 7,388, 7,388-89.
82 See In re Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, Comm'n Remand Op. on
Violation of Section 337, at 4, Inv. No. 337-TA-487 (Sept. 17, 2008), 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at *5-6
(public version of original issued on August 25, 2008).
74
75

[8:271 2009]

Gray Market Trademark Infringement

as it related to Deere EVSPFHs.8 3 The court vacated the Commission's final
determination stating that "SKFclearly places the burden on Deere to establish that
all or substantially all of the sales were materially different from the alleged gray
market goods. Thus we must remand this case to the ITC for a determination of
84
whether Deere bore its burden under SKF."
The court also stated that "[oin
remand, Deere may rebut the presumption that all sales by its authorized dealers
were authorized. However, Deere bears the burden of proving that sales of European
85
forage harvesters by its authorized dealers were not authorized sales."
On June 20, 2006, the Commission remanded the investigation to the A.L.J. for
proceedings consistent with the court's decision in Bourdeau.8 6 The A.L.J. issued his
Remand Initial Determination on December 20, 2006 and held that Deere had
rebutted the presumption that dealers were authorized to sell EVSPFHs because
Deere had not granted its dealers actual authority to sell EVSPFHs in the United
States.8 7 The A.L.J. also found that the number of sales at issue was, in any event,
so small that 'substantially all' of Deere's authorized US. sales were of North
88
American version forage harvesters.
After an unprecedented twenty-one months of deliberating, the Commission
issued its Remand opinion on August 25, 2008.89 In the Agricultural Vehicles
Remand, the Commission reversed and remanded the A.L.J.'s determination and
terminated the investigation finding no violation of Section 337.90 In doing so, the
Commission further developed the already well-developed body of gray market case
law at the ITC and clarified two key issues: (1) what constitutes an "authorized"
92
sale 9 and (2) what constitutes "all or substantially all".

V. THE HYDRA ULIC EXCA VATORSDETERMINATION

The Commission instituted its investigation Certain Hydraulic Excavators on
September 6, 2006, based on a complaint filed by Caterpillar, Inc. ("Caterpillar") for
93
gray market trademark infringement related to imports of hydraulic excavators.
Twenty-one respondents were named in the investigation. 94
Nineteen of the
83 Bourdeau, 444 F.3d at 1327.
84 Jd
85 Id.
86 In re Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, Remand of Investigation to

Presiding Administrative Law Judge; Rescission of General Exclusion Order and Certain Cease and
Desist Orders 3, Inv. No. 337-TA-487 (June 20, 2006), 71 Fed. Reg. 36,357, 36,358.
87 In re Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, Final Initial Determination
45-46, Inv. No. 337-TA-487 (Dec. 20, 2006), 2006 ITC LEXIS 862, at *69-70.
88 Id., 2006 ITC LEXIS 862 at *69-70.
89 In re Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, Comm'n Remand Op. on
Violation of Section 337, Inv. No. 337TA487 (Sept. 17, 2008), 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806 (public version
of original issued on August 25, 2008).
90 Id.at 51, 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at *80.
91Id.at 11-48, 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at *16-75.
92 Id.at 48-51, 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at *75-80.
9 In -r Certain IJydraL1ic Excavators and Com-onents Thereof Notice of Investigation, Inv.

No.337-TA-582 (Se-pt 6,2006), 71 Fed Reg. 52,577.
94I., 71 Fd.Reg. 52577, 52,577-78.
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respondents were terminated from the investigation based on settlement
agreements. 95
The two remaining respondents did not participate in the
investigation and were subject to default orders. 96 With all of the participating
respondents terminated based on settlement, Caterpillar moved unopposed for
summary determination seeking a general exclusion order. 97 On September 9, 2008,
the A.L.J. issued his Initial Determination, finding that Caterpillar had met its
burden of rebutting the presumption that it had authorized its official dealers to sell
gray market hydraulic excavators in the United States. 98 The A.L.J. also found that
Caterpillar had met its burden of establishing that all or substantially of its
authorized sales in the United States were materially different from the gray market
goods at issue. 99
On October 30, 2008, the Commission determined, sua sponte to review the
A.L.J.'s determination and specifically requested Caterpillar address certain
questions and submit comments in light of the Commission's September 18, 2008
remand determination in Agricultural Vehicles.100
On January 21, 2009, the
Commission issued its determination reversing the A.L.J.'s determination that that
Caterpillar had met its burden of rebutting the presumption that it had authorized
its official dealers to sell gray market hydraulic excavators in the United States, but
affirming the A.L.J.'s determination that Caterpillar had met its burden of
establishing that all or substantially its authorized sales in the United States were
materially different from the gray market goods at issue. 10 1 Thus, the decision
provided even further clarification on what constitutes an "authorized" sale and what
102
constitutes "all or substantially all".

VI. AUTHORIZED DEALERS

An important issue in recent gray market cases has been which sales in the U.S.
should constitute "authorized" sales by the U.S. trademark holder. 103 In particular,
should the sales by authorized distributors be considered authorized sales by the U.S.
trademark holder such that it cannot obtain relief against gray market goods. 104 The
Federal Circuit has stated that sales by authorized dealers are presumed to be
authorized by the trademark holder. 105 In vacating and remanding the Commission's
Final Determination, the Federal Circuit held that "the ITC must presume that sales
5 I nc C rtain Hydraulic Excavators ani Components Thereof, Comr'n Op. 2, Inv. No. 337TA 582 (Feb 3,2009) (public ,ernonoforiinal issued on January 21, 2009).
96Id. at 2-3.
97Id. at 3.
98 Id. at 3-4.

99Id.at 4.
100 1r tO Certain Hydraulic Excavators an Components Thereot, Notice of Comm'n Decision to
Review the Administrative Law Judge's Final Initial Determination; Schedule for Written
Submission 2, Inv. No. 337-TA-582 (Oct. 30, 2008), 73 Fed. Reg. 65,879, 65,879-80.
101 In re Certain Hydraulic Excavators and Components Thereof, Comm'n Op. 12, 14, Inv. No.
337-TA-582 (Feb. 3, 2009) (public version of original issued on January 21, 2009).
102 See id.
103 Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 444 F.3d 1317, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
104 -d. at 1323-24.
1051
Id. at 1327.
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by authorized dealers were in fact authorized by [Complainant]."106 The Federal
Circuit further specified that "[Complainant] bears the burden of proving that sales

107
of European forage harvesters by its authorized dealers were not authorized sales."

Despite the clear language of the Federal Circuit, parties have continued to
argue, in a completely circular fashion, that gray market sales by a trademark
owner's authorized dealers are not "authorized sales" unless the trademark owner
affirmatively authorizes its dealers to sell gray market excavators. 10 8 However, this
is precisely what the Federal Circuit said the plaintiff cannot do in a gray market
case. 10 9 The Federal Circuit held that a plaintiff cannot "disclaim the sales of
any... [gray market products] by simply asserting that such sales were not
authorized." 110 The Court then made it explicitly clear that "[Complainant] bears the
burden of proving that sales of [gray market imports] by its authorized dealers were
111
not authorized sales."
With respect to authorization, in the Agricultural Vehicles Remand, the
Commission agreed with the A.L.J. that agency law was the proper analysis but
found error in that the A.L.J. focused only on express authority and failed to consider
the doctrine of "apparent authority". The Commission stated:
[T]he ALJ reasonably found agency law to be probative of the question of
authorization in the gray market context.
However, the ALJ's
"authorization" analysis was incomplete because he failed to consider
whether, despite the absence of actual authority, John Deere dealers
nevertheless had apparentauthority to sell EVSPFHs in the United States
(i.e. whether the respondents reasonably believed, based on the acts and
omissions of John Deere, that sales of EVSPFHs in the United States by
official Deere dealers were authorized by John Deere). Our analysis takes
into account that the focus of trademark infringement law is on the
potential for third party confusion in the marketplace, and that the
respondents, in the original investigation, argued that Deere's official U.S.
and European dealers had apparent authority to sell EVSPFHs in the
United States. For these reasons, as elaborated further below, the
Commission determines that resolution of the question of whether Deere's
dealer sales were authorized must include an inquiry into whether John

10;

-d.

Id.
108 See, e.g., In re Certain Hydraulic Excavators and Components Thereof Comm'n Op. 8, Inv,
No. 337TA582 (Feb. 3, 2009) (public version of original issued on January 21, 2009). Indeed, in
Hydraulic Excavators, Complainant Caterpillar and the Office of Unfair Import Investigation both
argued that not only were sales by the Caterpillar's authorized dealers not "authorized" because
Caterpillar disavowed them, but even argued that sales by Caterpillar, Inc.'s wholly owned and
controlled domestic subsidiaries were not authorized sales. Id.
107

109 Seo Bourdeau, 444 F.3d at 1327.
110 Id.
111

Id.
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Deere's U.S. and European dealers possessed apparent authority to sell
112
EVSPFHs in the United States.
The Commission went on to find that although there was no evidence of express
authorization by Deere for the Deere dealers to sell EVSPFHs, Deere's behavior in
the marketplace with respect to EVSPFHs was "such that a reasonably prudent
businessman would be led to believe an agency was created." 113 In particular, the
Commission considered that the following facts established the dealers with apparent
authority to sell EVSPFHs:
(a) John Deere's agreements with its official U.S. dealers; (b) the
involvement of official John Deere dealers in the United States and Europe
in the sale for importation and sale within the United States of EVSPFHs;
(c) John Deere's knowledge of and reaction to such importation and sales;
(d) the significance for an analysis of apparent authority of John Deere's
"Machinefinder.com" website and the financing of EVSPFHs by JD Credit;
and (e) the reasonableness of the conclusion drawn by the respondent
independent dealers, as a consequence of John Deere's acts and omissions,
that Deere's official dealers had apparent authority to sell EVSPFHs in the
United States.

114

Similarly, in the Hydraulic Excavators Determination, the Commission found
that sales by Caterpillar's authorized dealers were authorized by Caterpillar because
Caterpillar's dealers had apparent authority to sell gray market hydraulic excavators
in the United States. 115 Like the Agricultural Vehicles Remand, the Commission
again focused on the acts and omissions of Caterpillar to conclude that the sales were
116
authorized.
Some independent and official dealers of used gray market Caterpillar hydraulic
excavators believed that Caterpillar authorized the sale of gray market excavators in
the United States based on the acts and omissions of Caterpillar's wholly-owned
affiliates. 117 Those dealers based their belief, in particular, on their knowledge of the
active sale and purchase of gray market goods by the Caterpillar wholly owned
subsidiary Caterpillar Redistribution Services, Inc. ("CRSI") and the apparent
knowledge of CAT Financial, another Caterpillar wholly-owned affiliate, that gray
market goods were being sold in the United States. 118 Taken in conjunction with
112 In re Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, Comm'n Remand Op. on
Violation of Section 337, at 12-13, Inv. No. 337-TA-487 (Sept. 17, 2008), 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at
*19-20 (public version of original issued on August 25, 2008).
113 Id. at 17, 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at *25 (quoting GeneralElec. Co. v. Speicher, 676 F. Supp.
1421, 1431 (N.D. Ind. 1988), rev'don other grounds, 877 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1989)).
114 Id.at 25, 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at *38-39.
11H5
In re Certain Hydraulic Excavators and Components Thereof, Comm'n Op. 9, Inv. No. 337TA-582 (Feb. 3, 2009) (public version of original issued on January 21, 2009).
116 Id. ("We believe, contrary to Caterpillar's representations, that the record is mixed with
respect to whether third parties in this case reasonably believed, based on the acts or omission of
Caterpillar, that Caterpillar's dealers had apparent authority to sell gray market hydraulic
excavators in the United States." (emphasis added)).
117 Id. at 11.
118 Id. at 11-12.
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Caterpillar's failure to express an objection to at least some of the Settled
Respondents' business practices as gray market importers, the Commission found
that Caterpillar's conduct led some dealers to believe that Caterpillar authorized the
importation and sale of gray market excavators in the United States. 119
Thus, the message from the Commission is clear that authorized dealer sales of
gray market products will be considered "authorized" sales by the trademark owner if
the trademark owner assists with these sales, has knowledge of the sales and fails to
act, or behaves in manner that would otherwise lead a reasonably prudent
businessman to believe an agency relationship was created. 120 Importantly, this
standard for authorization applies equally to authorized sellers both in the U.S. and

abroad. 121

VII. ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL
Beginning in SK, the Federal Circuit made clear that to prevail in a Section
337 gray market trademark infringement investigation, the complainant must show
that all or substantially all of its authorized products sold in the U.S. had each of the
material differences from the imported "gray" goods. 122 In SKF,the court stated:
[A] plaintiff in a gray market trademark infringement case must establish
that all or substantially all of its sales are accompanied by the asserted
material difference in order to show that its goods are materially different.
If less than all or substantially all of a trademark owner's products possess
the material difference, then the trademark owner has placed into the
stream of commerce a substantial quantity of goods that are or may be the
same or similar to those of the importer, and then there is no material
difference.... [A] trademark owner's argument that consumers would be
confused by gray goods lacking an asserted material difference from the
authorized goods is inconsistent with the owner's own sale of marked goods
also lacking that material difference from its own authorized goods. To
permit recovery by a trademark owner when less than "substantially all" of
its goods bear the material difference from the gray goods thus would allow
the owner itself to contribute to the confusion by consumers that it accuses
gray market importers of creating. 123
This all or substantially all test is consistent with long-standing trademark
black letter law, under which a trademark holder cannot contribute to confusion in
Id. at 12.
See In re Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, Comm'n Remand Op. on
Violation of Section 337, at 41-42, Inv. No. 337TA487 (Sept. 17, 2008), 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at
*65-66 (public version of original issued on August 25, 2008).
121 See id. at 43, 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at *67-68.
122 Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 444 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2006); SKF USA
Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 423 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
123 -d. at 1315; see also Bourdeau, 444 F.3d at 1326 n.4 ("[A] trademark owner must show that
all or substantially all of its authorized goods are accompanied by each of the claimed material
differences to satisfy that standard." (quoting S!, 423 F.3d at 1316)).
119

120
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the market by selling product lacking asserted material differences and still allege
infringement by others selling the same products. 124 This is grounded in the longstanding principle of trademark law that, to obtain relief, a trademark owner must
show not only that non-confirming sales will diminish the value of its mark, but also
that it has established practices and policies to ensure conformity on its own part. 125
Similarly, a complainant in a Section 337 gray market trademark infringement
action cannot contribute to confusion in the market by selling substantial quantities
of goods with the same material differences possessed by the gray market imports. 126
Neither the Federal Circuit nor the Commission has established an immutable
minimum threshold for the volume of sales necessary to constitute "all or
substantially all" of a complainant's total authorized U.S. sales, but they have
provided clear guidance. In SKF, the Federal Circuit stated "we do not go so far as
Martin's Herend to hold that the sale of even one authorized item lacking a material
difference defeats infringement." 127 Instead, the court in SKF went on to hold that
the "all or substantially all benchmark recognizes that something less than 100%
compliance will suffice and certainly permits a small amount of nonconforming
goods." 128 The court ultimately upheld the Commission having found only 87.4% of
authorized sales were conforming and thus SKF failed the "all or substantially all"
test. 129
Although the Federal Circuit decision in SKF only upheld the Commission's
finding that 87.4% of sales is not all or substantially all, the Commission went on to
defend an even higher level of conforming sales before the Supreme Court in its
response to SKF USA's petition for certiorari4 finding 97.4 percent conformance to
not be sufficient stating:
In this case, for example, petitioner failed to prevail on its gray market
claim not because it authorized the sale of more than a single
nonconforming good, but because at least 2.6%13 of its authorized sales
SC, 423 F.3d at 1315; see also Bourdeau, 444 F.3d at 1321.
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 6-7 (2d Cir. 1996); see also
Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 37 F.3d 74, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1994) (trademark holder that failed to
comply with its own procedures was not entitled to preliminary injunction preventing sale of goods
that do not meet those same standards); Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 988
F.2d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 1993) (beauty salons that sold hair care products did not always provide a
consultation with each sale; as a result, sale of same products in drug store without consultation
could not constitute trademark infringement).
126 SHF 423 F.3d at 1315.
127 Id. at 1316 (analyzing Martin's Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co.,
124

125

112 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1997)).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1317.
130 Interestingly, in its pre-hearing brief in Hydraulic Excavators, the Office of Unfair Import
Investigation ("ouIr') took the position that the 2.6% reference in the Commission's brief at the
Supreme Court was a "typo." In re Certain Hydraulic Excavators and Components Thereof, Staff
Pre-hearing Statement, Inv. No. 337-TA-582 (May, 21 2008) (issued confidentially). We find this
position dubious. In the Federal Circuit appeal, SKF USA had argued that only 2.6% of its sales of
bearings were non-conforming product. Brief of Appellant SKF USA Inc. at 12, 13, 20, SKF USA
Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 423 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1460). The Commission had
argued that 12 .6 % of the sales were non-conforming.
Nonconfidential Brief of Appellee
International Trade Commission at, SKF USA Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 423 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir.
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were of nonconforming goods. Given the vast quantity of bearings that
petitioner sells, it was reasonable for the Commission and the [Federal
Circuit] to conclude that petitioner had placed into the stream of commerce
131
a substantialquantity of nonconforming goods.
Thus, in keeping with Federal Circuit precedent, the "all or substantially all"
requirement imposes a very high threshold for conforming sales. Recognizing this
precedent, the Office of Unfair Import Investigation has stated that it is "reasonable
to interpret 'substantially all' to mean 'less than all, but not much less."' 13 2 By
contrast, some have argued that United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit's decision in Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Development Corp.133 held
that 95.6% of a trademark holder's sales are sufficient for infringement. 13 4 Thus,
while the case law and Commission precedent leading up to the Agricultural Vehicles
Remand suggested that "all or substantially all" imposes a very high threshold for
conforming sales on complainants, it remained unclear what level of non-conforming
sales by a trademark owner would be acceptable under the "all or substantially all"
test.
In the Agricultural Vehicles Remand, the Commission took a more practical
approach and focused on the activity of the trademark owner as a whole. 135 Indeed,
rather than conduct a rout mathematical analysis, the Commission focused on
whether "the trademark owner has placed into the stream of commerce a substantial
quantity of goods that are or may be the same or similar to those of an importer, then
there is no material difference." 136 The Commission looked to the purpose of the all
or substantially all test and focused on the Federal Circuit's language in SK,
stating:
[r]elief for the trademark owner is not appropriate, therefore, when the
trademark owner has sold a substantial quantity of goods in the United
States that are the same or similar to the gray market goods of which it
complains because "[t]o permit recovery by a trademark owner when less
than 'substantially all' of its goods bear the material difference from the
2005) (No. 04-1460); see Brief of Appellant SKF USA Inc., supra, at 7. Thus, when the Commission
stated that "at least 2.6%" of SKF USA's sales were non-conforming it was accepting, arguendo,
SKF's 2.6% number. Had the Commission intended to refer to its own 12 .6 % number, it likely would
have stated this as "as much as 12.6%". Calls to the Office of General Counsel of the Commission
confirmed that OUII's position was incorrect.
131 Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition at 7, SKF USA Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
548 U.S. 904 (2006) (No. 05-1236), 2006 WL 1463610, at *7 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
132 Brief of the Office of Unfair Import Investigations in Response to the Commission Decision
not to Review in Part the Initial Determination on Remand at 25-26, In re Certain Agricultural
Vehicles and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-487 (Apr. 9, 2007) (quoting Continental Can Co.
v. Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (Independent) Pension Fund, 916
F.2d 1154, 1155 (7th Cir. 1999) (public version of original filed on March 6, 2007).
13386 F.3d 3 (2d Cir. 1996).
134 Id. at 7 n.i.
135 In re Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, Comm'n Remand Op. on
Violation of Section 337, at 17, Inv. No. 337-TA-487 (Sept. 17, 2008), 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at *26
(public version of original issued on August 25, 2008).
136 Id. at 49, ITC LEXIS 1806, at *76 (emphasis omitted) (quoting SKF USA Inc. v. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 423 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
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gray goods thus would allow the owner itself to contribute to the confusion
by consumers that it accuses gray market importers of creating." 137
Thus, the Commission concluded that John Deere bore the burden of
demonstrating that it had not placed into the stream of commerce a substantial
138
quantity of goods that are or may be the same or similar to those of an importer.
The Commission stated at the outset "[w]hat quantum of nonconforming sales by
the trademark owner constitutes a 'substantial quantity' will vary according to the
facts and circumstances of a given case, including actual evidence of consumer
confusion." 13 9 The Commission went on to find that because the SPFHs market is
generally characterized by high prices and low sales volumes that the sale of a small
volume of EVSPFHs could be considered substantial. 140 The Commission went on to
conclude that EVSPFHs sold in the United States by official John Deere dealers from
1997 to 2002 accounted for somewhere between forty percent and fifty-seven percent
of the total sales of EVSPFHs in the United States. 141 Therefore, the Commission
concluded "Deere dealers were responsible for introducing a 'substantial quantity' of
142
nonconforming goods into the stream of commerce."
By contrast, in the HydraulicExcavators Determination, the Commission found
that although Caterpillar had authorized sales of gray market excavators in the
United States, such sales were not significant enough to be considered a "substantial
quantity". 143
The Commission expressly distinguished the facts in Hydraulic
Excavators from those in Agricultural Vehicle. 144 Unlike in Agricultural Vehicles,
the Commission found the facts in Hydraulic Excavators showed a very large gray
market for the goods at issue but a very small role played by the trademark owner's
affiliates and dealers. 145 Unlike in Agricultural Vehicles, the Commission also found
in Hydraulic Excavators that the trademark owner's nonconforming sales were very
small compared to its overall sales of hydraulic excavators in the United States
during the same period. 146 The relative quantity of nonconforming sales in Hydraulic
Excavators was sufficiently low, in light of evidence of a very large number of foreign
suppliers of gray market hydraulic excavators and a wide network of domestic
importers, that the Commission found that Caterpillar, its affiliates, and its official
dealers, had not contributed significantly to the consumer confusion for which
Caterpillar blamed the Settled Respondents and Defaulting Respondents. 147 The
Commission, therefore, affirmed the A.L.J.'s determination that "all or substantially"
Id., 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at *76 (alteration in original) (quoting SIF 423 F.3d at 1315).
So id. at 51, 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at *80.
139 Id. at 49, 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at *76.
140 Id. at 49-50, 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at *77.
141 Id. at 50-51, 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at *79.
142 Id. at 51, 2008 ITC LEXIS 1806, at *79.
143 In re Certain Hydraulic Excavators and Components Thereof, Comm'n Op. 14, Inv. No. 337137
138

TA-582 (Feb. 3, 2009) (public version of original issued on January 21, 2009). Query whether the
outcome in Hydraulic Excavators would have differed had the participating respondents not settled.
Without an opposing view from respondents, both the A.L.J. and the Commission were forced to
accept Caterpillar's characterization of the facts.
144

Id.
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Id,
Id,
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all of Caterpillar's sales of excavators during the period were conforming goods that
8
contained the material differences.14
Thus, the Commission has interpreted the "all or substantially all" test
differently depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. Specifically, the
message to take from the two differing outcomes appears to be that the "all or
substantially all" test will be significantly more stringent in markets characterized
by high prices and low sales volumes than in markets for high volume and lower
priced products. 149 Nevertheless, regardless of the nature of the market, the
Commission's standard for "all or substantially all" remains much less stringent than
that of some circuit courts of appeal, where even a single sale has been held to
preclude a trademark owner from recovering for gray market trademark
150
infringement.

CONCLUSION

The ITC continues to be the most effective and cost efficient venue for redressing
trademark infringement by imports and for curbing imports of gray market goods
that infringe U.S. trademarks. The ITC's remedies are unmatched by any form of
relief available in the federal courts and its policies and procedures are particularly
designed to handle the multi-party litigation involving imports to which gray market
trademark infringement cases lend themselves. However, the ITC also has provided
a clearly articulated standard for obtaining relief under Section 337. Trademark
owners should heed the pronouncements of the ITC in its past gray market
determinations in deciding whether to avail themselves of the ITC's broad
jurisdiction and powerful remedies.

18 Id.

Compare In re Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, Comm'n Remand
Op. on Violation of Section 337, at 49-51, Inv. No. 337TA487 (Sept. 17, 2008), 2008 ITC LEXIS
1806, at *75-80 (public version of original issued on August 25, 2008) (finding because of high prices
and low sales volume a small number of non-conforming sales by trademark owner defeated "all or
substantially all" test), with In re Certain Hydraulic Excavators and Components Thereof, Comm'n
Op. 14, Inv. No. 337-TA-582 (Feb. 3, 2009) (public version of original issued on January 21, 2009)
(finding high sales volumes required a higher volume of non-conforming sales to defeat the test).
150 See, e.g., Martin's Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296,
1304 (5th Cir. 1997).
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